We first prove that ontological models of the quantum state which are capable of reproducing the Born probability rule and fall in the class of ψ-epistemic models are inconsistent with the Schödinger time evolution. We then model the ontic state space as a complex projective Hilbert space that embeds the projective Hilbert space of quantum mechanics and define a minimalist epistemic state as an average over a set of "hidden states" in the larger space. We show that such a model incorporates probability amplitudes and admits an epistemic interpretation of quantum states. Finally, we prove a second theorem to show that such a model is compatible with locality but ontic models are not.
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Although quantum mechanics has reigned as an outstandingly successful and accurate description of the physical world for almost a century, the interpretation of its state function has been of considerable debate since its inception. Central to this debate have been entanglement, measurement and violations of Bell-CHSH inequalities by the quantum state, signatures which have been hailed as its hallmarks [1] [2] [3] . Some have advocated a realist interpretation while others have preferred a subjective or epistemic interpretation. The most imperative question, then, is whether the wavefunction is an objective entity which is determined by the elements of reality or is a state of knowledge about the underlying reality.
Recently a no-go theorem has been proved by PuseyBarrett-Rudolph (PBR) [4] with a couple of reasonable assumptions to rule out a subjective (epistemic) interpretations of the quantum state. In another work, it has been shown, under the assumption of free-choice of measurement settings, that only a realist or ontic interpretation of the wavefunction is possible [5] . Lewis et al [6] have, however, shown that if one drops the preparation independence assumption and also slightly weakens the definition of an epistemic state, it is possible to have an epistemic interpretation of quantum states. Using continuity and a weak separability assumption, Patra, Pironio and Massar [7] have argued that epistemic states are incompatible with quantum theory. However, the situation is far from clear and continues to attract physicists [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] .
In this letter, we will first show (in Theorem-I below) that certain ontological models that reproduce the Born probability rule are inconsistent with the Schrödinger evolution. Ontological models that are ψ-epistemic fall in this class. This is a simple and powerful demonstration of all previous results that aim to rule out ψ-epistemic models. Our proof holds without any additional assumption such as preparation independence, free-choice of measurement settings, or weak separability.
Notwithstanding this, then, we ask whether it is still possible to have an epistemic interpretation of quantum state since it has been argued that such an interpretation may be preferable on many counts [14] . We show that if one suitably modifies the way probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are reproduced in the ontic description, it is possible to retain its epistemic nature. Towards that aim we introduce a certain structure of the ontic state space and a suitable definition of quantum states. To be specific, we postulate that the ontic state space is a complex projective Hilbert space which embeds the complex projective Hilbert space of quantum mechanics, and define a quantum state as an average over a small dense range of unknown ontic states-which we call "hiddenstates"-in this larger space. We emphasize that we do not use a probability distribution and an indicator function (response function) to reproduce Born's probability rule as is usually done. We directly relate quantum states to ontic states through a probability amplitude. This is a major departure from all the ontological models that exist in the literature. In some sense, such quantum states are close to the ontic states but somewhat smeared. This may be thought of as a "minimalist ψ-epistemic" model which does not depart too much from reality and yet can resolve many paradoxical features of the quantum world. Furthermore, we prove a second theorem to show that such an epistemic model is compatible with locality but ontic models are not.
In order to have a clear perspective of ontological models and their implications, it is important to state at the outset some useful notions defined by Harrigan and Spekkens [15] (henceforth referred to as HS) that are being followed in the current literature. First, an 'ontological model' is set in the background of an 'operationally' defined theory whose primitives are preparation and measurement procedures. The goal of an operationally defined theory is to prescribe the probabiliarXiv:1401.4104v2 [quant-ph] 29 Jan 2014 ties of different outcomes of measurements, given various preparation procedures. An 'ontological model' of an operational theory is one whose primitives are properties of microscopic systems. In such a model a preparation procedure is assumed to prepare a system with certain properties, and measurements are supposed to reveal something about these properties. An 'ontic state' in such a model is defined as a complete prescription of the properties of a system, and is denoted by λ. The space of such ontic states is denoted by Λ. It is assumed that even when an observer knows the preparation procedure P , she may not know the exact ontic state that is produced by this preparation procedure, and assigns over Λ a probability distribution µ(ψ|λ) to each quantum state ψ with µ(ψ|λ) > 0 and an 'indicator (response) function' ξ(ψ|λ) to each state ψ such that the Born rule is reproduced [16] :
According to HS, an ontological model can be classified as (i) ψ-complete which is ψ-ontic, (ii) ψ-supplemented which is also ontic but incomplete, and (iii) ψ-epistemic which is ψ-incomplete.
The ψ-complete model makes the identification Λ = CP(H) qm , the complex projective Hilbert space of quantum mechanics, and prescribes µ(ψ|λ) = δ(λ − ψ). There are, however, two different ways, according to HS, in which an ontological model can be incomplete. It can be ontic and yet incomplete if additional variables (collectively labeled by ω) are required to complete the theory, as in hidden variable models. In such cases, Λ = (ψ, ω) and the quantum state is termed ψ-supplemented. Another way in which the quantum state can be incomplete is when an ontic state λ corresponds to two or more quantum states ψ and φ corresponding to two distributions µ(ψ|λ) and µ(φ|λ) over Λ with a non-zero overlap ∆. In this case, an ontic state in ∆ does not encode the quantum state which can therefore be regarded as epistemic, i.e. mere knowledge. According to HS, Einstein favored this interpretation of the quantum state.
Below, we will show how to rule out ψ-epistemic ontological models within the HS definition. Now we state one of the main result as a theorem.
Theorem-I ψ-epistemic ontological models that satisfy the Born probability rule given by conditions (1) and (2), with distributions µ(ψ|λ) > 0 in open sets Λ ψ for all ψ are inconsistent with the Schrödinger evolution.
Proof.-Let |ψ and |φ be two distinct non-orthogonal epistemic states corresponding to an ontic state λ in the overlap region ∆ = µ(ψ|λ) ∩ µ(φ|λ) with ∆ an open interval in Λ. Consider the quantum state |ψ(t) ∈ H at time t which satisfies the Schrödinger equation
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system. Invoking the Born rule in the ontological model and putting |φ = |ψ(t) in Eqn. (1), one obtains
By definition the response function satisfies
and 0 elsewhere, where Λ ψ = {λ|µ(ψ(t)|λ) > 0}. Note that we require µ(ψ|λ) > 0 to avoid µ(ψ|λ) = 0 for some values of λ ∈ ∆, because the response function ξ(ψ|λ) need not be unity for such values [11] . Now consider two distinct quantum states |φ = |ψ(t + dt) and |ψ = |ψ(t) . Then, by working to leading order in dt, we have
|ψ , H being the Hamiltonian generating the unitary time evolution, and H ψ = ψ|H|ψ . Note that for a quantum state to evolve in the projective Hilbert space a necessary and sufficient condition is that it should have a non-zero speed v, where v is defined as v = dD dt = 2(∆H) ψ and dD is the infinitesimal Fubini-Study metric over the projective Hilbert space [17, 18] . The infinitesimal distance as measured by the Fubini-Study metric on the projective Hilbert space is defined as
Thus, the energy fluctuation (∆H) ψ drives the quantum state in CP (H). However, from Eqn. (1) we have
because the indicator or response function ξ(ψ|λ) is constant over Λ ψ (Eqn. (5)) and does not have any explicit ψ or t dependence, resulting in d n ξ(ψ|λ) = 0 ∀n. This contradicts Eqn. (1) and completes the proof.
Thus, even though Eqns (1) and (2) can reproduce the probabilistic predictions at any given time, it cannot reproduce the predictions of the Schrödinger time evolution at later times. This is an alternative proof of the no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic models. The theorem is a consequence of the ψ-epistemic states having continuous Hamiltonian evolution but not the indicator or response functions. Furthermore, since the ontic states in ∆ do not encode the epistemic states, evolution of the latter do not reflect any evolution of the former. We should add that the proof of Theorem-1 is based on the analyticity of ξ(ψ|λ) in the open set Λ ψ . Epistemic models that do not satisfy this condition are not covered by the theorem.
An alternative ontological model.-Ontological models are supposed to reflect closely the underlying reality that our physical theories are supposed to describe. However, quantum mechanics has been riddled with the measurement problem and nonlocality, features that one would like to avoid in an ontological model. We show in this letter that this objective can be met by (i) assigning a complex projective Hilbert space structure CP(H) to the ontic space in which the projective Hilbert space CP(H) qm is embedded, and (ii) changing the definition of ψ-epistemic from the one given by HS. We will illustrate these ideas in greater detail below. The ontic states in this larger space will be denoted by |λ and we will refer to them as "hidden-states". For simplicity, we continue to use the same notation Λ for our ontic space as in the previous section, though our ontic space is different from that in the HS framework, and the two ontic spaces are logically different. The most important difference is that the HS model is based on an ontic space Λ constructed from probabilities which satisfy the Born rule, whereas our ontological model is based on probability amplitudes, and quantum states are averages of "hidden" ontic states.
Alternative Definition of ψ-epistemic The definition of epistemic states given by HS and adopted by all subsequent authors with some variations leads to contradictions with standard quantum mechanics, as we proved in Theorem-I above. Hence, to see if ψ-epistemic models can still be saved, it is necessary to change the technical definition of ψ epistemic given by HS. According to them, the basic definition is that 'ψ has an ontic character if and only if a variation of ψ implies a variation of reality and an epistemic character if and only if a variation of ψ does not necessarily imply a variation of reality.' The ontic models satisfy this definition by having a one-to-one correspondence between ψ and λ. Epistemic states must avoid such a relationship. One way out is to have multiple distinct quantum states compatible with the same ontic state λ, a choice made by HS. An alternative would be to define a quantum state ψ as an average over multiple distinct ontic states λ with a probability amplitude that can change on obtaining new information about the ontic state. This is a Bayesian approach which we adopt. Both these choices imply that a single 'ontic state λ does not encode ψ', and furthermore, that a single 'quantum state does not parametrize the ontic states of the model at all'. A hidden variable model and its generalizations, on the other hand, are characterized by the ontic space Λ parametrized by ψ and supplementary variables ω. We will avoid such an option.
To see how our scheme works, let us first denote a basis M of CP(H) qm whose elements are constructed from the set of quantum states {|ψ }. Next, let us assume that distinct (orthogonal) elements of {|ψ } correspond to non-overlapping, non-empty dense sets {|λ } ∈ Λ = CP(H). This requires a partitioning P of Λ into subsets λ corresponding to all possible distinct quantum states which cover Λ: ∅ ⊂ P, λ = Λ, λ a ∩ λ b = ∅, λ a , λ b ∈ P, a = b. This means that, for every preparation procedure P ψ , there is a unique quantum state |ψ but a dense open set of ontic states λ ψ with the probability amplitude A(λ|P ψ ) ∀λ ∈ λ ψ , the quantum state being an average of the "hidden-states" over A(λ|P ψ ) (the propensity function) defined by
with the requirement
where we have put |A(λ|P ψ )| 2 = P (λ|P ψ ). Thus, P (λ|P ψ ) is a probability density over the ontic space. This ensures that all quantum mechanical predictions are reproduced. In particular, we have
where |φ is non-orthogonal to |ψ , and λ ψ ∩ λ φ = ∅. This is the Born rule for the transition probability between two quantum states. Note that this description not only reproduces the Born rule, it also reproduces the amplitudes for quantum transitions, which is not possible in the conventional ontological models. In the limit of the widths of the ontic state sets {λ}, corresponding to uncertainties of knowledge, shrinking to points, one recovers the ψ-complete model. It is in this sense that ψ is incomplete and epistemic (mere knowledge) in this model. Since it is not ruled out by Theorem-I, we will refer to this model as a consistent "minimalist ψ-epistemic" model.
It is worth emphasizing that barring the ψ-complete model, in all ontological models considered so far, one obtains averages of physical observables over some 'hidden variables', and there is no direct relationship between these and the quantum states. We have prescribed a definite relationship between a quantum state and an open dense set of ontic states |λ ∀λ ∈ λ ψ given by (8) . The ontic states |λ may thus be called 'hidden states'. In this sense the epistemic quantum states are somewhat smeared descriptions of the ontic states.
Locality.-We will now explain how the 'minimalist ψ-epistemic' model is consistent with the locality principle. The origin of the debate on nonlocality in quantum mechanics can be traced back to Einstein's observations at the 1927 Solvay Conference. Consider the case of a single particle wavefunction suggested by him to demonstrate that an ontic wavefunction ψ describing the particle and locality are incompatible [19] . After passing through a small hole in a screen, the wavefunction of the particle spreads out on the other side of it in the form of a spherical wave, and is finally detected by a large hemispherical detector. The wave function propagating towards the detector does not show any privileged direction. Einstein observes:
If |ψ| 2 were simply regarded as the probability that at a certain point a given particle is found at a given time, it could happen that the same elementary process produces an action in two or several places on the screen. But the interpretation, according to which the |ψ| 2 expresses the probability that this particle is found at a given point, assumes an entirely peculiar mechanism of action at a distance, which prevents the wave continuously distributed in space from producing an action in two places on the screen.
Einstein later remarks that this 'entirely peculiar mechanism of action at a distance' is in contradiction with the postulate of relativity.
An advantage of a consistent ψ-epistemic ontological model is that a sudden change or collapse of the wavefunction can be interpreted as a Bayesian updating on receiving new information, thus avoiding nonlocality. To see this clearly, we will follow the line of argument constructed by Norsen [20] . Let A and B be any arbitrary pair of disjoint points on the detector. The entangled state of the particle and the detector is then
where |ψ and |χ denote the particle and the detector states respectively. In the ψ-complete model, there is a unique λ = Ψ. In the consistent ψ-epistemic model, on the other hand, the two terms can be taken to correspond to two disjoint elements λ A , λ B ∈ λ Ψ .
We are now in a position to state and prove Theorem-II which addresses the question of locality.
Theorem-II In an ontological model, ψ-complete and locality are incompatible, while in the consistent epistemic model, ψ-epistemic and locality are compatible.
Proof.-The probability of simultaneous detection of the particle at A and B in the ψ-ontic model is given by
The locality assumption requires that we must have p(1 B |1 A , λ) = p(1 B |λ). Hence, using λ = Ψ, we have
which is inconsistent with the quantum mechanical prediction that this probability vanishes. Hence, the locality assumption is false in this model. Now consider the consistent ψ-epistemic model in which λ = {λ A , λ B } ∈ λ Ψ and λ A ∩ λ B = ∅. The probability of simultaneous detection of the particle at A and B is
(13) In this model the locality condition requires p(
which is consistent with the quantum mechanical prediction. Hence, this model is compatible with the locality assumption. This completes the proof of the theorem.
We may remark that the "hidden states" do play a role in the situation considered by Einstein. Indeed we can say that one of these states is revealed by the measurement. The spherical wavefunction ψ is an average over these states with a uniform probability amplitude, each point on the sphere corresponding to an ontic state in the dense subset λ ψ which represents the uncertainties on preparation of the state. When a spot appears on the detector, it reveals the corresponding ontic state-thereby one can say that the measurement removes the uncertainties. The "hidden states" introduced in this paper also clearly demarcates the difference with the hidden variables which lie hidden forever.
Concluding remarks.-We have proved that ψ-epistemic ontological models based on positive definite probability distributions and everywhere differentiable response functions satisfying the Born rule specified by conditions (1) and (2) are inconsistent with Schrödinger evolution (Theorem-I). Thus, the ontological models with ψ-epistemic wavefunctions, though they can reproduce measurement results at a fixed time, are silent about dy-namical aspects. This impelled us to look for an alternative ontological model which can accommodate an epistemic interpretation of the quantum state. An epistemic interpretation is preferable because it can do away with many conundrums of quantum theory such as measurement and nonlocality. Accordingly, we postulate that the ontic space is a complex projective Hilbert space CP H that embeds CP H qm and that is partitioned into disjoint open dense sets. The quantum states appear as averages over these "hidden states" in the larger ontic space. This makes quantum mechanics a somewhat smeared but fairly close description of the underlying reality. Within this framework, the epistemic interpretation is shown to be consistent with locality (Theorem-II). We believe that although the HS definition of epistemic states is inspired by Einstein's views, it is our definition that achieves his objective. We hope that the minimalist ψ-epistemic model presented here can provide new insights to the nature of quantum states.
